In the summer of 2007, the Diehard fan sat down with legendary coach Emory Bellard at his home north of Austin. Bellard grew up in Texas, played college ball there, coached great high school teams, then went on to coaching legend at Texas and later as head coach at Texas A&M.
Looking out over a golf course, and with his ever-present graph paper by his chair — the better to sketch option plays for visitors — Bellard discussed how it all came about. Fit and tan at 80, he looks as if he could line up at halfback and run some more plays.
Sitting down with the great Emory Bellard
DF: What kind of situation did you walk into when Darrell Royal hired you? Texas was a high-profile situation.
Bellard: Texas has been down a little — for Texas they were down. They had been 6-4 for three consecutive years, including the ’66 season. The first year I was at Texas I was sort of amazed that the personnel had dropped a little bit. I think at the end of spring training Darrell said, “Mike, [Campbell, the defensive coordinator], I’d like to have you work in the press box with him.” So I remained coaching the linebackers that year and worked the press box with Mike Campbell. At the end of the season, right after the last game, which was against A&M, Darrell just decided to reorganize the staff and he called after the game and wanted to know if I wanted to take over the offense. I had good offensive theories, good theories. They were were real sound, and it wasn’t a bunch of malarkey. We went through spring training doing those things, but some of the backs that we had, we had good backs that were runners and they weren’t guys that you’d want to put out at the wingbacks or flankers or any of that bit, they were running backs. So they needed to be in, and I had been working for quite a while on an option concept and it was all about the triple option and the best of the linemen that I could come up with. That offense was eventually known as the Wishbone; I (didn’t) even have a name for it or anything like that, but a sportswriter, Mickey Herskowitz, I think, wanted to put the term Wishbone on it, but that’s irrelevant so far as the offense was concerned.
DF: Where did this concept come from? I mean, in high school did you run some version of the Split-T or something like that?
Bellard: Yeah, I had always loved running option football and always loved to run three- back offenses, which I had always done. Eventually that was the reason I felt like Darrell would okay this because he had always been in those situations as a player and as a coach. He had always coached Split-T, except I think one year they ran a Wing-T, but not when I was there. I had always felt like there are three optimums in football. One of them is if you get a body on a body and a ball carrier running behind it, that is one option. That is as good as you can hope for. You know, you gotta assume that the other side has got some sense, but that is one optimum. And the second optimum is to get a two-on-one situation with an option. Now it is a known fact that that’s an advantage. That is as good as you can get it, but you gotta handle all these other people adjacent to it but still, if you can get it down to that, then you’ve got something. And the third one is get a one-on-one situation with a pass. You always had that going. Defenses, if you know defensive football, they’ve got to honor anybody going deep, whether it’s the tight-end, split-end, or otherwise, you gotta honor that. Then, if you know all that from a defensive standpoint, you know that that’s a fact. And so your offense’s gotta be designed by how the second man from that outside has gotta take the pitch, the third man has gotta take the quarterback and where they play the fourth man dictates how you’re gonna play against the inside thread. So those are the principles under which it was based, and they’re just as sound as a dollar.
DF: And they are still sound.
Bellard: And they are sound today. If you get equal people, you’re not gonna lose because the offense is not sound. You may get whipped somewhere in there but that’s the horse of a different color. You may get whipped on the other side of the ball too, you know, your defense may not be strong enough to stop the other guy. Nonetheless, I wasn’t totally satisfied even though we had an excellent spring training that year. I had been working on this. I was noticing you had graph paper because I always have graph paper sitting next to me. I work on graph paper all the time.
DF: And is it a myth that you can’t throw effectively from the Wishbone?
Bellard: Well, that’s just what I was talking about. That tight-end, every time we ran the option, was always going into that deep third. And if that guy that was supposed to be covering the deep third didn’t cover the deep third, the passer went behind him. Caught the pass and scored. Against Tennessee that first year we put it in. If you don’t cover them [the ends], now they [safeties] can be up there making tackles, but they can’t cover the deep third. So it’s one of those optimums I was talking about. The biggest mistake I made in the passing game was assuming that we needed something short, but we didn’t. We just needed to throw deep. We did not need to throw short because everybody was coming up this way trying to stop the run. So as long as we kept out deep threats, post patterns and the streak patterns — that’s what we should have been placing the emphasis on. But like I said, I had been working on that since 1954. My last year at Ingleside, if I’d have stayed there, I was going to go to this triple-option concept. The alignment of the backs weren’t exactly the same but over the years, I had rarely pulled it in to make sure. There were three places I wanted that lead back to be able to block, in other words, I wanted him to be able to block number two in the structure, number three in the structure and the first off-line support inside the structure. That was the combination of the options that we could run. His relationship to where the football was and where the pitchman was, all that part dictated that formation, that unusual looking formation. It’s a terrible alignment to do anything with unless you’re gonna run the triple option. If you’re gonna run the triple option, well that’s the best way. That is the best way to align them to run the triple option. DF: And so you pulled a fullback in from where they lined up in a Split-T? Bellard: Well, the fullback was about on a level with the two halfbacks in the Split-T. The two halfbacks are really the ones that were deeper. The fullback, in fact, he was up very, very close to start with; we moved him back just a little bit. His heels were at four yards and the halfbacks were at five yards deep so they had a little more depth than normal because most of their action was this way and this way, or counter-steps and then going back in and doing different things like that. But again, they were aligned in a relationship to where their relationship and the ball were all together whenever you run option football over to both sides. In other words, your pitchman was way out in front of where the pitchman was in the Split-T. In other words, the quarterback was making pitches this way and in the Split-T, he was making pitches back here [demonstrates]. So the speed with which he’d get to the corner was a lot faster. The capability of making those blocks in the relationship to where the ball was at the time we made those blocks up there combined into making a complete option package. I got my son and some kids, some high school friends of his, and looked at it, and then there were some kids that completed their eligibility that were in summer school at the University of Texas and I got them down to the stadium and I was going to see if I could make the reads and if I could make the reads, well, I knew I could teach a darn good athlete to make them. I ran it down there and we put it together and there was about three or four linemen that were there. They’d completed their eligibility and finished their school there and they were in summer school. So I got them and got sort of a half-line set up. Then there was Andy White, who had completed his eligibility at Texas and was still finishing up that summer. He was in school, so I got him and I taught him, and he picked it up real quick. Then I wrote it up and presented it to Darrell. I remember him saying, “What the hell is this 1, 2, 3 business?” You know, I was telling him the concept, and of course it was all predicated on principles on which all defense is based on. Like I said, if you know anything about defense, you’ve got to operate within those frameworks of defense. It was all predicated on the fact that you know that so that’s what the triple option has got to be. It’s gotta take care of those situations. So we talked, talked, talked, and talked daily you know, for several days and then had him come down and I demonstrated it and then I’m just as certain of this as anything — he had always run option football and he had always run three-back offenses, so I knew that part was not going to be a factor for Darrell. Sure enough, he said, “Lets go with it.” So we put it in [1968] and we tied the first game and lost the second one and then we won the next 30. And everybody in the country was looking to run the Wishbone. And it became the winningest formation in the history of the game of football for quite a while there. We gave it to Alabama, we gave it to Oklahoma. I mean, their execution knowledge and so forth of the offense came from us; we gave it to Oklahoma. I just saw Barry [Switzer] the other day. He was offensive coordinator at Oklahoma and Chuck Fairbanks was the head coach and Darrell came into my office one day and we’d already just wore Oklahoma out a couple years and he said, “Chuck is in trouble, he’s gonna lose his job and they want to put in the Wishbone. Barry is gonna be calling you, help him all you can.” I shook my head, I said, “Darrell, you got to be joking?” He said, “No, I wanna help him.” I said, “Well, I can admire your wanting to help somebody but I said, gosh darn, not them.” That’s true, too, because they got to where they had so much speed it was hard for us to catch them. He [Royal] called me about four or five months ago. He calls every now and then and I call him every now and then. But anyhow, he called and said, “You know, I was just sitting here thinking, I might not be as benevolent if I had it to do over (again).” I said, “I hope not, Darrell. I don’t think we could go through that again.”
DF: I know that today coaches consult with each other and go to spring practice or whatever. So they would consult with you at that time? Like coaches from Alabama and Oklahoma?
Bellard: I spent a week in a motel with the Alabama coaching staff because Darrell and Barry agreed. I went to Alabama and spoke at their high school clinic over there. During that week I was with the Alabama coaching staff, when they put the Wishbone in, I was on the phone with Barry all the time. You can’t imagine the number of colleges that were at our spring practice. We conducted a darn coaching clinic every day; it was the biggest mess I ever messed with. I got so tired of talking to people. Pepper Rodgers, he came down from UCLA and they had had a bad year. Mark Harmon, the young actor, he was to be the quarterback and he was a good one, too. Ended up being a good one. But I spent about a week and I’d go back up to the office and talk with him at night and that jackass went back out and put the Wishbone in at UCLA and had a book published before Christmas. Boy, that takes a lot of gall there, now. I just, that really…
DF: But they didn’t run it very long did they?
Bellard: They ran it the rest of the time he was there. He went to Georgia Tech soon after that. They had a real good year. DF: And then Alabama put it in, was it ’71?
Bellard: They put it in just before Oklahoma played Southern Cal. Apparently Southern Cal didn’t know they were gonna run it. I didn’t see any of the players but I’ve always thought there was some players on campus at the time I was there but I don’t know that. That’s just talk. But anyhow, they ran it and just beat the living hound out of Southern Cal. At one time I know that more national championships had been won with the Wishbone, and it was supposedly the most-winning formation in the history of football. I’m talking about a lot of national championships. Alabama and Oklahoma and the University of Texas and there were lots of them coming.
DF: And then you brought it out in ’68 at Texas and Bill Bradley started out as quarterback?
Bellard: Bill Bradley. Bill was one of the best athletes that I’ve ever seen. He came to the University of Texas — Texas had been 6-4 a couple seasons and he was a freshman and you know, he was gonna solve all the problems. He played on very poor football teams his first two years. I always had the feeling that he felt like he had to do whatever had to be done to bring the team to the forefront. He played under such great pressure, which was unfair, because like I said, I’m just amazed at how poor a football team we were my first year there in a lot of ways. You know, we didn’t have great kickers. The first year I was there we recruited a great freshman class and we had all those great qualities in that great freshman class, but they weren’t on the (varsity); we weren’t a good football team. The personnel had dropped off and you know, we just weren’t real good for the University of Texas. For somebody else it might have been all right, but it wasn’t for the University of Texas. And I think Darrell would tell you that. That certainly wasn’t according to what they were capable of or normally had done but, it had dropped down some. Bill, and you talk about running that option, in practice he could run the hound out of it but I always felt like when we’d get in games he wanted to press it too much. He couldn’t relax and play. You know, he always had that feeling that “I got to make that play” and he had always made the play in high school and he always made the play, but he got to Texas, he couldn’t always make the play. He had a hard time, not that it was his fault, but he had a hard time — I don’t know another way of saying it — but using the abilities of the other players. I mean, he couldn’t bring them into the picture quite as strongly. And [James] Street was just the opposite. We moved Street in there, you know, he had never lost a football game. He’d get out there and play. He’d just relax and play, have fun, you know, play football. But Bill Bradley was just as talented, and when he moved over to defense — we moved him to defense because an athlete like that didn’t need to be on the sideline — but he got over there on the defense and I’d never seen anybody enjoy playing football anymore than Bill did. He could jump on a receiver and just eat his lunch. That’s what he was used to doing. It was just he and that guy and boy, he was gonna win that fight most of the time. I mean, he was good. He was a good athlete. He could punt a football right or left-footed, and I’m talking about kick the hound of it. He was as good a punter as I have ever watched. He could throw right or left-handed. He was a great athlete.
DF: And so James Street was the opposite? Bellard: Oh yeah, he just crawled out there and away we went.
DF: And he was, was he a junior?
Bellard: Yeah. Yeah, he became the starting quarterback in ’68 and then of course he was the starting quarterback in ’69, too.
DF: And then you stayed at Texas through ’71?
Bellard: Yeah.
DF: Now you mentioned earlier about throwing out of the Wishbone formation. Like some teams were not — some of Oklahoma’s teams were not very effective throwing the ball, but you said as long as you had the element of surprise that the pass was a good weapon for your offenses?
Bellard: Well, you know, it’s like most anything. At that particular point in time, it was during a different era as a starting point. In most instances, the leading passing teams in the nation invariably had losing records. Most offenses were very run-oriented and people say, every time you see a Wishbone, so much it was “a cloud of dust.” People can say “three yards and a cloud of dust,” but those runs are predicated on a principle, though, that you put‘em back-to-back, you have a continued march toward the goal line. So there is some truth in it, I guess, but I used to not understand how people could make that statement. Like Oklahoma, with all the speed that they had and just flying up and down the field. I don’t know how they could call that a cloud of dust.
DF: Of the quarterbacks that you had in the Wishbone, can you just name them and in a sentence or two give us their best attributes for running that offense?
Bellard: Well, James Street. James Street was a fierce competitor. I think that is sort of a characteristic of any really great quarterback. They compete. And that means that they make plays under dire circumstances, and they know what to do and what not to do instinctively. You know, they have those qualities, because I think there is a point in there where you gotta turn ‘em loose and let ‘em play. First, you’ve gotta give him all the fundamentals and the basics. He was a fierce competitor, and he had all the respect in the world for his teammates. They knew he was gonna make whatever play that was necessary, and did. He never lost a game. That’s gotta instill a lot of confidence in a lot of folks. And then Eddie Phillips came after him and it was out of the same mold as James Street. He wouldn’t have gone into the pros with an arm but he could throw deep as good as anybody, and so could Eddie. We worked on it awful hard. But he was a great deep passer. You know, you can throw a hundred passes, you can’t throw anymore perfect than that one. But he could do it one time if needed or he could do it twice if needed. Cotton Speyer against Tennessee that first year. Street, he nailed him twice. Speyer beat that all-American corner. DF: So Eddie Phillips was out of the same mold? Bellard: Yeah, Eddie had to work to become a good passer, I think, but he did. He did become a good passer. Doing what we were doing, you know, he could throw deep and throw a good touch and all that business. He had a good feel for it at a point in time. We worked awful hard on it. We threw a lot. We didn’t throw a lot in games, but we threw a lot in practice. I know we beat Oklahoma that first year with the Wishbone. We completed quite a few passes in that football game, I know that, and especially to our tight-end. As for the others, well, the same attributes that all of them have. You know, all the guys that played good. An option quarterback has to have a good concept of the offense that you’re running. The ability to not make the bad play and have consistency making the good plays.
DF: I know that Jack Mildren and Steve Davis at OU and guys like that carried the ball a lot. Did your quarterbacks carry the ball that much, or were they primarily managing the offense, throwing, that kind of thing?
Bellard: That depended on what the defense was doing. Again, that’s what the option is. If you got two on a one, what you do is gonna determine who is gonna do the carrying. So you got a bunch of wild choices, and the position of that lead blocker up there. So you’re running different options. Some of those options promote the quarterback running because that blocker is in a position not only to block number two in the structure, which is the man that’s responsible for the halfback, so to speak, the pitch. But when you change the blocking pattern to where you include the block of that lead halfback blocking number three man in the structure, who is the man that’s gotta be responsible for quarterback, and so that takes your option out to number two rather than on three and in that instance you’ve got the only man that can cover that pitch out there (number two) I’d say the only man, basically that’s what it is. And if he doesn’t, if he takes that pitch or tries to take it away, your quarterback is gonna be doing the running. And that’s what Jack Mildren was running off of (was) the load option.
